Within the IEB framework, the Chair of Energy Sustainability promotes research into the production, supply and use of the energy needed to maintain social welfare and development, placing special emphasis on economic, environmental and social aspects. There are three main research areas of interest within the program: energy sustainability, competition and consumers, and energy firms. The energy sustainability research area covers topics as energy efficiency, CO2 capture and storage, R+D in energy, green certificate markets, smart grids and meters, green energy and biofuels. The competition and consumers area is oriented to research on wholesale markets, retail markets, regulation, competition and consumers. The research area on energy firms is devoted to the analysis of business strategies, social and corporative responsibility, and industrial organization. Disseminating research outputs to a broad audience is an important objective of the program, whose results must be relevant both at national and international level.
Introduction
As the share of renewable electricity increases worldwide, it will have a growing impact on electricity system prices and costs. The direct effect of renewables on wholesale prices (the merit order effect) is typically negative as they provide generation at very low or zero marginal cost and displace more costly generation. Renewables can also decrease prices indirectly by lowering market power in systems where generators bid strategically, as highlighted by Browne et al. (2015) and Ben-Moshe and Rubin (2015) . At the same time, integrating generation that is intermittent and difficult to predict has costs. Plants Several papers describe how changes in market design could decrease balancing costs by incentivising the renewable sources to minimize their forecast errors. Holttinen (2005) analysed the Nord Pool balancing market, arguing that wind should be balance responsible.
Swinand and Godel (2012) and Bueno-Lorenzo et al. (2013) study how payments could be imposed on renewable generators to reduce their forecast errors. Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute (2016) estimate the impact of renewable energy on the adjustment service costs (that include both balancing costs and capacity payments). The authors find a positive and significant impact of renewable generation (solar and wind) on these costs for Spain.
We study the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM), using hourly data from 1 January 2008 to 28 August 2012. The dataset for the island of Ireland is particularly well-suited to 2 our analysis. First, extensive data on the system are available from the beginning of the SEM in November 2007. The compulsory nature of the SEM means that every generator with a capacity larger than 10MW has to offer electricity on the market. Similarly, all buyers have to buy from the pool. We are therefore able to base our analysis on complete system data, which is not possible for jurisdictions where generators and consumers engage in bilateral contracts outside of the main market. Second, the island has limited interconnection with other systems allowing us to identify the effect of wind more easily. Third, it has experienced a large increase in wind capacity, more than doubling from about 900MW at the end of 2007 to almost 2100MW at the end of August 2012, the period chosen for this analysis. Finally, unexpected and persistent outages at the main storage plant in the SEM and at the interconnector between the SEM and BETTA provide natural experiments for the evaluation of the effect of storage and interconnection on system prices both directly and via their interaction with wind generation.
As expected, we find a negative correlation between the system marginal price (SMP) and wind generation. When large-scale storage is not available the marginal effect of wind on the spot price increases at night. When interconnection is not available the effect of wind decreases for a few hours of the day.
On the other hand wind generation is positively correlated with the constraint payments provided to generators, our measure of balancing costs. The effect of wind on constraint payments increases when storage is not available. As expected, forecast errors of both demand and wind increase constraint payments.
Our results show that the overall effect of wind on system prices is positive, as its dampening effect on marginal prices is stronger than the effect on constraint payments and the costs associated to the subsidies given to wind generators. When storage is significantly reduced, the cost of wind on constraint payments more than doubles, but the net effect of wind generation stays positive. The existence (or absence) of interconnection has a much weaker effect on wind's propensity to affect system costs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 depicts the SEM in more detail. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains our methodology and describes the estimation of the effect of wind on the system marginal price. Section 5 presents the results for constraint payments. Section 6 describes the subsidies accorded to wind and estimates their size while Section 7 concludes.
The SEM
The Irish electricity market encompasses the electricity systems of both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, making it a cross-jurisdiction, cross-currency system. The SEM is a compulsory pool system, where plants bid in the day-ahead market and are called to generate on the basis of the merit order: plants with lower bids are called to generate ahead of more expensive plants until total generation equals total demand. Each plant's bid reflects its short run marginal costs and includes the cost of fuel and carbon dioxide emission permits needed to generate a megawatthour (MWh) of electricity, in addition to operation costs. Generators submit up to 10 price-quantity pairs that apply to all 48 half hours during a 24-hour period, but can change every 24 hours. The System Marginal Price (SMP) reflects the bid of the marginal plant, or the cost of generating the most expensive unit of electricity needed to meet demand.
The regulation authority monitors the market through the market monitoring unit.
Power plants are required to bid their short run marginal cost in line with the bidding code of practice available from the regulator's website (http:www.semcommittee.com). As an additional check of market power there is a system of future contracts in the form of contracts for differences (CfD). Existing evidence suggests that this regulation is successful, leading to limited market power (Gorecki, 2013 In addition to the short-run payments, power plants also receive capacity payments, designed to cover additional capital costs.
It's useful to highlight some of the characteristics of the SEM SMP:
• It has never been censored from above, due to the upper bound for the price being set high (at €1000/MWh) and firms' bidding behavior being regulated.
• There are no negative prices, despite negative prices being theoretically possible. At the moment wind companies are price takers and do not therefore bid a price in the system. Since 2011 they have priority dispatch, in line with EU rules. 
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• Electricity consumers do not bid directly in the market, except for a few virtual plants that can bid in decreases of demand. The SMP is calculated on the basis of the supply curve (based on the merit order of day-ahead bids from generators) and actual demand in every period. The SMP is finalised ex post, after actual levels of demand are verified.
• All bidders and all consumers (represented by suppliers) obtain and pay the same uniform wholesale price of electricity in every period.
• In the short run electricity demand is not elastic to price, given the limited bidding on the demand side.
• During our period of analysis the Transmission System Operators (TSO) curtailed wind if it exceeded 50% of demand at any given time, to ensure system stability, i.e.
voltage and frequency control. 4 Bidding rules in the SEM have been modified and clarified over time. Table 1 summarises the main changes to the Bidding Code of Practice. In 2010 the government tried to recover windfall gains to thermal generators that came from the free allocation of carbon dioxide permits. It instituted a 'carbon levy' and stated that it could not be included in bids and therefore passed on to consumers. In 2012 the Supreme Court ruled that the carbon levy could be passed onto consumers, causing its repeal within a few months.
During those months generators were allowed to include the cost of carbon twice in their bids, once for the European Trading System and once for the carbon levy.
We highlight these changes since they may have systematically affected bidding behaviour and therefore market prices although, as discussed later, we find no structural breaks associated with these dates.
Data
We build a dataset of hourly information for electricity generation, demand, plant availability and daily data on fuel and carbon costs from 1 January 2008 to 28 August 2012.
Most of the data on the SEM is downloaded directly from the system operator, SEMO, with the exception of wind generation and electricity demand. Quarter-hour wind generation for the Republic of Ireland comes from EirGrid and half-hour wind generation for Northern Ireland comes from SONI, the system operators of the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland respectively as these sources include both wind farms registered with the SEM and generation estimates for smaller wind farms not registered with the SEM.
Unregistered wind accounts for 20% to 25% of total wind generation, during the 2008-2012 period. 5 We aggregate the series to hourly levels. We also take demand data from EirGrid and SONI to obtain all-island demand, gross of transmission and distribution losses. We think it is a better measure of demand than the load variable provided by SEMO. The SEMO load variable is net of imports and exports to the system, nets demand by the amount of electricity produced by wind that is not registered directly with SEMO and includes electricity used by pumped storage.
We also measure wind and demand forecast errors, as they affect constraint payments.
We define the forecast errors as actual levels minus the day-ahead expected value. The day-ahead expected value is only available from SEMO and therefore refers to wind farms We limit this concern by including forecast errors (i.e. changes in the variables) rather than forecasts in levels.
5 We obtain this estimate by comparing wind generation of the wind farms registered with SEMO with total wind generation estimated by EirGrid and SONI. Table 2 reports summary statistics for our dataset, based on hourly data. Wind generation represents 11% of demand on average in the data.
We check the stationarity of the price series. If the SMP series were non-stationary, the estimated coefficients in our analysis could be picking up a spurious relation between the SMP and other regressors, due to a potentially common trend over time. In our case, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test rejects the hypothesis of unit root in our endogenous variable, the SMP, at the 1% level. 6 The Im-Pesaran-Shin test for panel data (Im et al. 2003 ) rejects the null hypothesis of unit root in our endogenous variables at the 1% level, confirming that the series is stationary. 7 We therefore analyse the relation between the system marginal price and its possible determinants in levels. The SMP follows the price of natural gas. Natural gas plants, or more specifically Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plants (CCGT), are frequently the marginal plant, therefore setting the SMP. Differences between SMP and natural gas prices are due to losses during conversion of energy, transport, operation and maintenance costs, the cost of carbon emission permits and the cost of turning plants on and off.
We also test potential breaks in the SMP series for the dates associated with SEM rule changes, highlights in Table 1 , but the Clemente and Rao tests for structural breaks show no effect for these dates. 
Estimation
Wind generates electricity at a low marginal price, since wind itself is free. As the amount of wind generation increases, we expect it to dampen the system marginal price. In this section we measure the extent of this effect and explore if it varies nonlinearly with wind. We identify the effect of wind generation W on prices P by taking advantage of the hourly information on wind generation and SMP. We rely on the high variability of wind, demand and net imports, which jointly determine how much electricity is generated in each hour. We assume that demand L is exogenous, which is reasonable in this market where demand is highly inelastic to price (in part because retail prices do not vary at high frequency) and demand varies substantially during the day. This implies that in practice we do not have to worry about simultaneity problems.
We do however have to represent supply-side effects carefully. Some supply-side variables affect the marginal price directly, for example the fuel prices. We include the price of natural gas and the cost of CO 2 emission permits, represented by F j , where j indexes the type of price. Other variables affect the price through the merit order, for example the level of plant outages and net imports.
Net imports (I) can be considered exogenous in our analysis: transmission rights to trade power along the Moyle interconnector are acquired ahead of time during our period of analysis. Moreover, McInerney and Bunn (2013) show that interconnector flows do not respond to contemporaneous electricity prices. The capacity margin mar measures the effect of both forced and unforced outages. It is defined as the difference between available capacity in every period (excluding wind, which is not predictable) and demand.
The more plants are available relative to demand (the larger the capacity margin mar), the lower the system price, as cheaper plants will enter the merit order. We also measure Table 1 ). We control for the higher prices during this period by including a CO 2 f ee dummy variable. Finally, the long period of our analysis (4 years) means that we have to control for other aspects of the market that change over time, including the commissioning or decommissioning of plants and regulatory changes, although on the latter see the discussion of Table 1. For every hour i, we wish to estimate the following equation:
We are not interested in the coefficients for the month-year dummy variables, so we transform Eq.(1) by taking the difference of the variables with respect to their month-year mean. This allows us to estimate the following system of equations (where the constant has also been differenced out), where each variable is defined as the difference of its levels from its month-year mean:
...
where:
and V is the variancecovariance matrix.
There are n = 24 equations in the system, one for every hour of the day, with i indexing hours and d days. We allow wind, demand and capacity margin to have a flexible specification by including them in levels, squared and cubed (h =1-3). We expect the system price to be affected more than proportionally by changes in demand when demand is already high, because significantly more expensive plants may enter the merit order.
The opposite holds for high wind levels, as we expect higher levels of wind to affect the system price less.
Cross-sectional dependence is a problem in macro panels with long time series (Baltagi, 2008) . Ignoring possible correlations of regression disturbances over time and between subjects can lead to biased coefficients. We test for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals in Eq. (2) with the Breusch-Pagan test, a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test.
We reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity between the residuals, with a χ 2 equal to 21114 and an associated p-value of 0. We therefore use robust standard errors.
We follow the methodology proposed by Zellner (1962) to account for the correlation between the residuals of each equation and use a two step procedure. In the first step, the system of equations described by Eq (2) is estimated by OLS. The second step estimates the parameters of the system using Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS), with the variance-covariance matrix estimated in the first step.
We also test for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals within each equation, possible as the T dimension of our system is quite high (we have 1460 observations for each hour). Using the xtserial test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation between the residuals and model the system with autocorrelation in the error term to avoid underestimating the standard errors of the coefficients. 9 The autocorrelation is accounted for by implementing a Prais-Winsten transformation with FGLS. 10 As a robustness check, we estimate Eq. (2) with a time-series approach. We use 9 The Wooldridge test to detect autocorrelation of residuals is based on a model estimated in first differences. In this model, the underlying assumption tested is that cov(
associated with the statistic is equal to 55.67. A detailed explanation of the xtserial test implemented by STATA is available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/116069/2/sjart_st0039.pdf.
10 The autocorrelated process of the residuals means that the estimation in levels with month-year dummy the ADF and the PAC of the residuals to determine the appropriate correlation structure of the model. This analysis highlights that the residuals are both correlated between hours and days. In particular, we find that the first 5 hours of the residuals are autocorrelated, as well as the hours 22 to 26. The results of this specification are reported in the Appendix.
Estimation: results
Results for a subset of hours are shown in Table 3 . Complete results for all the hours are reported in Table A1 . All energy is expressed in GWh for ease of reporting. Table 3 shows a significant and negative effect of wind generation on the system marginal price, as expected. The effect is larger during the day than at night, as it displaces more expensive plants during the day.
In the SEM, day-time peak demand occurs between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. and the evening peak is between 5 and 7 p.m. (corresponding to hours 17 to 19 in our analysis).
The evening peak is the overall daily peak in the winter, whereas the day-time peak is the daily peak during summer months.
The coefficients on the square and cube wind term are both significant for several hours, including during early morning hours, confirming that the effect of wind is non-linear, at least for a few hours of the day.
The outage at Turlough Hill increases the effect of wind on the SMP at night, possibly because wind generation cannot be used to pump water back up to the upper storage. Extended outages at the Moyle interconnector do not impact wind's effect at night, whereas they decrease the effect of wind for a few hours during the day.
Full results are in the appendix in Table A1 . Other variables behave as expected.
Demand has a generally positive effect on SMP and has a distinct non-linear effect. The price of natural gas is positively related to electricity prices. The capacity margin has negative effect on SMP: when demand decreases or more generation is available, electricity prices tend to be lower all else being equal.
variables and the estimation in first differences from the month-year mean are not identical. The AR(1) process involves lagging all explanatory variables. Since dummy variables do not appear explicitly in the differenced version, they are not lagged in the AR(1) adjustment. In practice the difference between the estimates is small. 
Marginal Effects
We calculate the marginal effect to assess the overall impact of wind, demand and capacity margin on the system marginal price and compare our results to papers that do not analyse the relations separately for each hour or model the relations as linear.
Equation 3 summarises the calculation:
where i is the variable of interest (wind, demand or capacity margin),ī is its mean value;
α is the coefficient of the variable in the linear form (i.e.W ind), β is the coefficient of the quadratic term, and γ is the coefficient of the cube. For wind, we also include in the marginal effects of the interaction between the dummies for Moyle and Turlough Hill outages, with I w equal to 1 when i is wind and 0 otherwise.
The standard errors of the marginal effects in Table 4 are calculated using the delta method. 11 Significance of the hourly marginal effects reflects the joint significance of the linear, squared and cubic approximation of the considered variables (wind, loads, and capacity margin), which may differ from the significance of the variables considered separately in Table 3 . The coefficient of the marginal effect of wind on the SMP, averaged over the 24 hours, is equal to -17.25. When the average is weighted by the level of average demand for each hour, the average is -18.17. For every MWh increase in wind generation (equal to about 0.2% of the average wind generation in our sample) the system marginal price decreases by €0.018/MWh, or about 0.03% of its average value in our sample, equivalent to an elasticity of -0.13 calculated at the mean. At the demand average of 4061MWh, this corresponds to an average reduction of total wholesale costs equal to €73.78.
We replicate the analysis for the period starting on 1 November 2009, to be consistent with the results we find for constraint payments (where the dataset is shorter). This leads to a demand-weighted average effect of 1MWh of wind equal to €-15.37. The average hourly demand for this period is 4014MWh, leading to a total reduction in average hourly costs of €61.68 per MWh of wind for the period. These are similar to the -18.17 shown in Table 4 . There are however some changes in the hourly effects. Without storage, the effect of wind during early morning hours is stronger.
These are times when wind tends to blow more. In the absence of storage, the additional wind cannot be used to pump water up to the upper basin. During the day, the pattern without interconnection shows a weaker effect of wind on the SMP perhaps because on average the interconnection flow is displacing less expensive rather than more expensive generation in the SMP during the day, so in the absence of interconnection the SMP is smaller and the effect of wind is also smaller. Figure 4 shows how these results compare to a few recent estimates for the effect of wind on spot prices. For each paper, we calculate the implied percentage change in spot price due to a 1MWh increase in wind generation and present its absolute value (all papers estimate a negative relation between wind generation and spot price change). We caution that comparing across studies is difficult, given differences in market design, generation 16 mix and estimation strategies. In particular, not all transactions occur in the spot market in some jurisdictions (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands). Moreover some jurisdictions display a concurrent increase in solar generation, which may depress spot prices on its own in addition to limiting wind's impact. In the SEM during this period there was essentially no solar power, which is also true for the Netherlands. In Germany solar generation increased from 1% to 5% in the 2008-2012 period. In Italy the solar share increased even more, going from essentially 0 to more than 6% of demand. Finally, markets in continental Europe are more interconnected, which may affect the impact of wind generation. We can make 2 observations. First, our estimates (red diamonds) are the largest in absolute terms. Second, within each study (country) the size of the effect tends to decrease over time as wind penetration increases, suggesting a non-linear and decreasing impact of wind generation. Our result is slightly higher than the value found for Ireland by Swinand and O'Mahoney (2015) , which uses a different specification and approach. 12 
Constraint payments: model and results
In the SEM, initial dispatch is determined in the day ahead and is based on the day-ahead bids, forecast wind, demand and plant availability and a simplified representation of generators' technical constraints. It abstracts from transmission and distribution constraints.
There are four main reasons why actual dispatch may differ from the day-ahead plans and give rise to constraint payments. First, system operators do not have perfect foresight.
There will therefore be real-time adjustments to account for unexpected changes in supply or demand, for example when capacity is not able to deliver. Second, in the presence of transmission constraints, some plants will have to generate less and others more than the market schedule to avoid surcharging transmission and distribution lines. Third, the system operator has to meet other system constraints, for example the maintenance of voltage and frequency stability throughout the system, which may change which plants actually generate. Finally, the cost-minimizing algorithm in the day-ahead market does not take into account all possible technical characteristics of the generators, whereas during actual dispatch the TSOs (and generators) are meeting all the technical requirements.
Constraint payments in the SEM have been growing over time, as shown in Figure 5 , from about 4% of system costs in 2008, calculated as the sum of the system marginal price times demand, constraint payments and capacity payments, to 6% in 2011 before falling back to 5% in 2012. 
Constraint payments: model
In this section we explore the effect of wind generation on constraint payments. We have to control for several factors: the increase in constraint payments could be in part due to the outage of the Turlough Hill power plant. Operation of the pumped storage plant is particularly relevant to this analysis, since it is used heavily to compensate for short-run imbalances in the system. The interconnector is also at times used by system operators to balance demand, although most of the evidence suggests that the Moyle interconnector is not used to optimise short-run operations (McInerney and Bunn, 2013).
The determinants of constraint payments CP at time t would ideally include indicators for transmission constraints T C, forced outages at predictable generation plants (such as thermal plants) F orOut, wind and demand forecast errors and underlying fuel prices P t .
Unfortunately, we do not have detailed information for all the explanatory variables in Equation 4. We are unable to account directly for transmission constraints, although we know that some plants are constrained on to avoid chronic transmission constraints that also affect system stability. 13 There are also three main system-wide constraints. The In order to control for the constraint payments associated with these constraints, which are independent of wind generation, we set the constraint payments associated with these particular plants equal to 0 when they are negative (i.e. when the plant was slated to run but did not because the transmission or system constraint did not take place).
We do not have hourly information on forced outages separately from planned maintenance, but we account for large periods of well-documented forced outages at two plants, the pumped storage plant at Turlough Hill and the Moyle interconnector.
To model the lack of perfect foresight by the system operator, we include both wind and demand forecast errors. We focus on the forecast error from the day-ahead market (24 hours ahead), as it is the most relevant in the case of the SEM. The forecast error variables are the difference between the actual outturn and the values expected in the day-ahead market, or x t − x t−24 , where x is either wind generation or demand.
Both the demand and the wind forecast errors are asymmetric. Wind is forecasted to be larger than its actual outturn for 29018 observations (91% of the total), against the 2825 periods when it is forecast to be lower (9% of the cases). Demand is forecasted to be higher than actual outturn 20335 times (82% of the cases) and lower only 4356 times, or 18% of the cases. As a result, it appears that the day-ahead market systematically over-estimates both system demand and wind generation available in the system, as shown in Figure   6 . This may result in increasing balancing costs. Mauch et al. (2013) report a similar asymmetry for US wind forecasts. At times of low wind, forecasts tend to underestimate wind generation, whereas the forecasts tend to overestimate wind generation when it blows strongly, thereby overestimating wind generation on average since the errors are proportional to the amount of wind. Plants that are constrained down return their unrealised costs to the system, while keeping the period's system marginal price. In other words, they keep the inframarginal rent for every period they were scheduled to run in the day ahead market, but were told not to run due to system constraints. Plants that are constrained up receive payments for their costs, but no additional payments. Typically the cheaper plants are scheduled in the day ahead, so there are positive costs to the system when the dispatch changes.
Over time we expect positive constraint payments to be larger than negative constraint payments, although in any given period we might observe negative constraint payments, for example if demand turns out to be lower than expected (some plants will be returning their unrealised costs and no plants will generate in their place) or wind generation turns out to be higher than expected as wind's generation costs are close to zero.
Based on data availability, as discussed above, we measure the effect of wind (and the associated wind forecast errors) on the size of constraint payments and estimate the following specification (reported as Model 1 in Table 5 ), using autocorrelated residuals to account for system dynamics. Here we also include month-year dummy variables. We therefore estimate the following equation, where each variable is the first difference from its month-year mean:
where
CP t are the system constraint payments that arise each hour, calculated as the sum of each plant's constraint payments and adjusted for system constraints as discussed earlier; L t represents system demand. We expect that the larger the demand, the higher the probability for congestion on transmission lines and so the larger the constraint payments.
The more wind W t on the system, the larger the forecast errors and the higher the probability of congestion, so we expect wind to have a positive effect on constraint payments. P t includes the price of natural gas, which is the most frequent marginal fuel, and the price of carbon dioxide permits. The larger these prices the higher we expect constraint payments to be. The set of dummy variables D include the outages of the Moyle interconnector and the Turlough Hill pumped storage plant and their interaction with wind generation. When the capacity margin mar is high, there are many plants available to increase generation. We therefore expect that if the dispatch changes, it will likely be at lower cost to the system, so we expect the capacity margin to have a negative effect on constraint payments.
We use the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation graphs to determine that the first 4 hours and the day ahead residuals are autocorrelated, as well as the hours 21 to 24.
The autocorrelated residuals capture some of the inertia of the system, as it takes plants a few hours to turn on or shut down. 14
Estimation results
Results for Model 1 in Table 5 shows that neither demand nor capacity margin are significantly different from zero, suggesting that the tightness of the market is not a significant driver of constraint payments. Higher natural gas prices are associated with higher constraint payments, as expected.
The demand forecast error is significant and positive. When demand in the system is higher than expected, more plants will need to generate and be paid to match demand. The coefficient on the wind forecast error is negative: when actual wind generation is higher than forecasted, constraint payments will be lower. When unexpected wind generation enters the system it displaces plants with a marginal cost of generation higher than wind.
When the unrealised costs of more expensive plants are returned to the market, they lower constraint payments. The opposite is true when the wind is lower than forecasted. As a robustness check we estimate with model 2, allowing the forecast errors to have a separate effect if they are negative or positive. Both the demand and the wind forecast errors are significant only when they are negative (when the realised value is smaller than the forecast). In this case the coefficient on the demand forecast error is 2.85. The smaller the realised demand relative to its forecast, the smaller the capacity payments.
The opposite holds for the wind forecast error. The forecast error for wind is equal to -4.82: when wind generation is smaller than its forecast level capacity payments increase.
The other results remain essentially the same. More wind increases constraint payments, all else being equal and the outage at the pumped storage plant also increases the effect of wind on constraint payments.
The analysis shows that wind generation is positively related to constraint payments, all other things being equal (including the level of wind forecast error). After controlling for other variables, every MWh of additional wind generation is associated with an increase in constraints payments of €2.35 in our Model 1 estimation, corresponding to about 0.012% of hourly constraint payments. This possibly occurs because when wind blows strongly across the SEM area, there may be transmission and distribution congestion. The wind series we use in the estimation is net of wind curtailment, but wind curtailment tends to be associated with periods of high wind generation. 15 Finally, Table 5 shows that the outage of the interconnector has no effect on constraint payments, whereas when Turlough Hill is on outage, constraint payments decrease. This is counter intuitive. It may be that at times when the pumped storage plant is not on line, more thermal plants are dispatched in the day-ahead market, leading to a higher probability that thermal plants are constrained down in the real market. On the other hand, when Turlough Hill is on outage, wind generation has an effect that is both stronger in statistical terms and more than twice as large, implying that at these times a MWh of wind generation increases constraint payments by €5.3.
Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute (2016) find that the short run elasticity of the sum of balancing and capacity payments to renewable generation (wind and solar) in Spain is between 1% and 5%. Our estimates suggest that a 0.2% increase in wind leads to a 0.012% increase in constraint payments, for an elasticity of about 5%. When storage is on outage the elasticity increases to 13%.
Wind subsidies
Energy policy in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland includes subsidies for electricity generated by wind. In Ireland this takes the form of a feed in tariff, called REFIT, which applies for 15 years to each renewable generator. Northern Ireland uses renewable obligation certificates (ROCs), designed to help the UK meet its renewable energy targets. These are granted to renewable generators for 20 years.
Wind support in Ireland has changed over time. We calculate the cost of wind support by calculating the REFIT payments to onshore wind generation during our period of analysis. The REFIT scheme was introduced in 2006 and provides a guaranteed price to renewable generators (or suppliers they enter into long term contracts with). The 2006 version of the program, that we focus on here, offered different levels of guaranteed prices, depending on the size of wind farms. For wind farms with less than 5MW export capacity, the guaranteed payments were slightly higher, as shown in Table 6 . 16 The REFIT regime provides a fixed payment equal to 15% of the guaranteed price of consumers. Here we consider the buy-out fee as the cost paid by consumers. 18 Table 7 16 DCENR source accessed July 2016 at http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/energy/SiteCollectionDocuments/ Renewable-Energy/RefitReferencePrices.pdf 17 The initial legislation on ROCs in Northern Ireland was passed in 2006 with the Renewables Obligation Order (Northern Ireland) 2006. Details on ROCs in Northern Ireland can be found at https://www. economy-ni.gov.uk/articles/northern-ireland-renewables-obligation 18 For an explanation of why the buy-out fee is reasonable approximation of the cost of ROCs to con-24 reports the buy-out fee in each fiscal year during the period of our study. It is more than 3.5 times larger than the cost of REFIT per MWh. This is consistent with other analyses comparing the renewable subsidy costs in the two jurisdictions (Deane et al., 2015) and may be one of the reasons the UK is moving to a feed-in-tariff support system starting in 2017. This cost should be interpreted as the cost to consumers of an additional MWh of wind generation, rather than the average cost of wind generation subsidies. Over time the subsidy expires (after 15 years for REFITs and 20 years for ROCs) whereas the wind farms may continue generating.
We calculate an average cost of wind subsidies across the two jurisdictions. We im- 
Conclusion
This paper analyses how wind generation influences the price and constraint payments in the Irish Single Electricity Market and compares it to the wind subsidy paid by consumers.
To define the impact on the system price, we estimate a system of hourly equations and find a consistent negative effect of wind. We show that the effect is not linear and is affected by the presence (or rather, absence) of storage. When Turlough Hill, the largest storage facility in the SEM, is on outage, the impact of wind on prices increases at night, possibly because wind cannot be used to pump water back of to the upper storage. Outages at the interconnector between the island of Ireland and Great Britain lead to a decreased impact during some hours of the day. We calculate the average effect of wind on prices and show that a MWh increase in wind generation (equal to about 0.2% of the average wind generation in our sample) leads to a decrease of the system marginal price equal to €0.018/MWh, or about 0.03% of its average value in our sample.
Second, we investigate if and how wind affects constraint payments. Our prior is that larger amounts of wind will lead to higher constraint payments, all else being equal. This is confirmed by our findings that show that wind generation is positively linked to constraint payments both directly and through the wind forecast error. The larger the errors in forecasting the level of wind and demand, the larger the constraint payments. In periods when storage is unavailable, the impact of wind generation on constraint payments more than doubles. We find no systematic effect of outages at the interconnector between the island of Ireland and Great Britain. Table B2 shows the results for the time series estimation. Here again, we take the difference of the variables from their month-year mean and estimate the following regression:
Appendix A Estimation results

Appendix B Robustness check
We control for the autocorrelation of the residuals by including lags 1-5 and 22-26, after verifying the autocorrelation and partial-autocorrelation graphs of the residuals. The marginal effect of wind on system marginal price is equal to -18.33, which is very close to the average of the marginal effects found with the panel estimate (-18.17).
The results of the time series estimates do not disentangle the impact of the wind, the interconnector and the storage during the different hours of the day. The results in Table   3 show that wind generation does not affect the system price homogeneously during the hours. In particular, wind is particularly significant during the night and the first hours of the afternoon, and this effect is not captured in the time series specification. Finally, storage and interconnector are not significant in Table B2 , but Table 3 shows that they are statistically different from zero for several hours of the day. Table C3 includes studies that calculate the marginal effect of wind on spot prices. The units of measure vary, but we create a common measure that identifies the change in the spot price (in €/MWh) given a 1MWh increase in wind generation. We then calculate the size of that change with respect to the average spot price. This is what we report in the right-most column of Table C3 . The average penetration or share of wind is calculated as the share of demand covered by wind generation and comes from each paper when it is reported. For papers that do not report average hourly demand or average hourly wind generation, the average penetration of wind is calculated using Eurostat data, specifically database nrg105a and the summary information on renewables reported in the SHARES tool (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares).
Appendix C Comparison with other studies
Appendix D REFIT calculations
We calculate the average cost of REFIT per MWh using half-hourly information on wind generation at the plant level, SMP and capacity payments to generators, downloaded from the market operator's website. We limit the analysis to wind generators in the Republic of Ireland, since REFIT applies only to companies in Ireland.
As stated in the main text, each plant is guaranteed a fixed price that varies by fiscal year, which starts on October 1 and ends on September 30 (shown in Table 6 ). The payment to wind generators is composed by a fixed portion (15% of the reference price for large wind) and a portion that depends on how much the plants make on the market. The first term is the fixed amount and is defined as 0.15 · P F IT y · t∈y Elec i,t . The second term shows that a positive REFIT payment is paid only if the generator does not receive at least the REFIT price on its average sales during the year. The REFIT payment is paid for all generation during the fiscal year in question. Table D4 In the hourly data for firms registered with the SEM there is one observation where generation is reported as negative and one where capacity payments are negative. We set these observations as missing. 
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The average REFIT payments by fiscal year and type of wind farm are reported in Table D5 . As expected, the average subsidy to small wind farms is larger than to large wind farms. Note that in 2008 there was no variable REFIT paid due to the large SMP.
In general, the size of the average REFIT payment is inversely correlated with the SMP.
The average presented in the last line is weighted by the number of periods in each year, but not by plant generation in each year. To compare to other costs and benefits of wind in our analysis, we also calculate the average REFIT payment for the period starting on November 1 2009, with a value of 14.96 · 0.91 + 16.91 · 0.09 = 15.14. This is the number that we report as the REFIT cost of 1MWh of wind in the main text.
